Chicago-Kent College of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Alexander Boni-Saenz

February 26, 2020

Age, Equality, and Vulnerability
Alexander Boni-Saenz

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/alexander_boni-saenz/28/

161
Age, Equality, and Vulnerability
Alexander A. Boni-Saenz*
This Article uses age as an entry point for examining how temporal
and methodological issues in egalitarianism make substantive equality
an unattractive goal for vulnerability theory. Instead, vulnerability
theory should adopt a continuous doctrine of sufficiency, which is a
better fit with vulnerability theory’s underlying aims and rhetoric.
Instead of evaluating what individuals have in relation to others,
sufficiency refocuses the inquiry on whether we have enough throughout
the lifecourse. In the context of vulnerability theory, enough should
be defined as the capability to be resilient as guaranteed by the
responsive state.

Introduction
Age is a unique and important socio-legal category.1 It simultaneously serves as
an involuntary numerical measure of one’s time in existence and a rich symbol
filled with social meaning.2 Age’s dual determinate and informative nature
*
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Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. abonisae@kentlaw.
iit.edu. For helpful suggestions and comments, I would like to thank Debbie
Dinner, Tova Gamliel, Daphna Hacker, Martha Fineman, Alon Jasper, Suzanne
Kim, Nina Kohn, Ariela Lowenstein, Lilach Lurie, Titti Mattsson, Sagit Mor,
Fusako Seki, Hila Shamir, Merril Silverstein, Laura Tamblyn Watts, the editors
at Theoretical Inquiries in Law, and participants at the Workshop on Legal
Transitions and the Vulnerable Subject at Emory Law School and the Elder
Law and its Discontents Conference at Tel Aviv University, where I presented
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Cite as: Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Age, Equality, and Vulnerability, 21 Theoretical
Inquiries L. 161 (2020).
See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Age, Time, and Discrimination, 59 Ga. L. Rev.
845, 853–61 (2019) (noting age’s unique characteristics and use in the law).
See Richard A. Settersen, Jr. & Bethany Godlewski, Concepts and Theories of
Age and Aging, in Handbook of Theories of Aging 9, 9–14 (Vern L. Bengtson &
Richard A. Settersen, Jr. eds., 3d ed. 2016) (discussing the biological, chronological,
psychological, and social dimensions of age).
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makes it useful for assessing vulnerability and performing care-based decisionmaking. For instance, doctors use age to evaluate whether mammograms might
be suggested to screen for breast cancer.3 Age is also legally significant. It
is a ubiquitous legal marker that is used in ways large and small to address
vulnerability in the population. For example, in the United States, various
state maturity rules protect minors who may lack decisional capacity from
making decisions that might bring them harm,4 while federal law protects older
employees from discrimination they might face in the market.5 The universal
importance of the aging process and the legal significance of age as a legal
tool make it an ideal entry point for examining certain unresolved theoretical
questions in vulnerability theory, as that theory embraces a universalist
lifecourse approach and endeavors to be a lens for analyzing law reform.
The central claim of this Article is that vulnerability theory should abandon
the pursuit of substantive equality. This may at first seem like an odd claim,
as the theory has time and again emphasized substantive equality as its goal,
in contrast to formal legal equality.6 But an examination of the temporal
issues in egalitarianism reveals that multiple temporal forms of substantive
equality, including lifetime and time-slice egalitarianism, are incompatible
with vulnerability theory. Further, the seeds have already been sown for a
rejection of equality’s comparative method by vulnerability theory’s own
critiques of formal legal equality.
By its own terms, vulnerability theory would be better off adopting a
continuous doctrine of sufficiency, which focuses not on what individuals
have in relation to others, but on whether they have enough throughout the
lifecourse. Enough — the sufficiency threshold — should be defined as
the capability to be resilient as guaranteed by the responsive state. While
adopting the doctrine of sufficiency raises additional questions or challenges
3
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See Kevin C. Oeffinger et al., Breast Cancer Screening for Women at Average
Risk, 314 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 1599, 1599 (2015) (“Women with an average risk
of breast cancer should undergo regular screening mammography starting at
age 45 years. (Strong Recommendation)”).
See Boni-Saenz, supra note 1, at 854–55 (discussing the various maturity rules
in both the public and private spheres).
See 29 U.S.C. §623 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer — (1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s age”).
See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an
Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1713, 1744–51 (2012)
[hereinafter Fineman, Beyond Identities] (arguing for a substantive equality
anchored in broad social and economic rights).
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for vulnerability theory, they are likely less intractable than those presented
by substantive equality.
Part I lays out the basic tenets of vulnerability theory and explores its
relationship with equality and age. Part II argues that vulnerability theory and
equality are in significant tension, particularly when one considers a central
but often overlooked egalitarian concern (time) and corresponding socio-legal
category (age). Part III offers a promising substitute for substantive equality
that is a better match for the vulnerability theory: a continuous sufficiency
standard focused on the capability to be resilient.

I. Vulnerability Theory and Age
This Part provides the background for understanding vulnerability theory
and its application to age, with particular reference to the works of Martha
Fineman, its chief proponent. It first introduces the basic components of the
theory, including its key concepts and critiques. Then it turns to the relationship
between vulnerability theory and age.
A. Vulnerability Theory
The central thesis of vulnerability theory is that vulnerability is a “universal,
inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition that must be at the heart
of our concept of social and state responsibility.”7 Fineman conceptualizes
vulnerability as a result of our embodied nature and the complex social
and institutional context that we inhabit.8 Further, vulnerability itself is a
multivalent concept. At one level, vulnerability is merely a facet of the human
experience, so it simply must be accepted.9 At another level, vulnerability is
clearly negative, as it has the potential to open us up to harm if we are not
prepared for it.10 Finally, at yet another level, vulnerability is positive, as it is

Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 8 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman,
The Vulnerable Subject].
8 See id. at 9–10.
9 See id. at 9 nn.24–25 (exploring inevitability and the relationship between
vulnerability and dependency).
10 See id. at 9 (“Vulnerability initially should be understood as arising from our
embodiment, which carries with it the ever-present possibility of harm, injury,
and misfortune from mildly adverse to catastrophically devastating events,
whether accidental, intentional, or otherwise.”).
7
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the basis for social organization, bringing us together as we are better able to
manage vulnerability through cooperation and mutual assistance than alone.11
Armed with these insights, Fineman takes aim at the liberal subject in
social and political theorizing. Central to many strains of Western thought,
this liberal subject is characterized in the following way:
Our contemporary legal subject is posited as an autonomous and
independent being whose primary demand is for liberty or freedom
from state interference. He claims a right to autonomy to govern his
own life, while at the same time asserts his freedom from responding
to the needs of others who should equally be independent and selfsufficient. . . . This liberal legal subject is a fully functioning adult — in
charge and capable of making choices. Unrestrained by the state, he will
be rewarded according to his particular talents and individual efforts. His
social relations are defined by concepts such as consent and supported
by legal doctrines such as contract and property. The attainment of
liberal economic roles — such as job creator, entrepreneur, taxpayer,
and, of course, consumer — define the aspirations and determine the
values for this legal subject.12
Fineman’s primary critique of the liberal legal subject is that it simply does
not reflect reality, as it is far removed from the real-life vulnerability and
interdependence experienced by the human population.13 This is most obvious
when one notes that the liberal subject never experiences the life stage of
childhood, which is characterized by dependency.14 But the critique is not
simply factual; it is also conceptual. The liberal subject narrows our focus to
notions that naturally flow from him,15 such as autonomy, self-sufficiency,
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See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 6, at 1755 (“Indeed, one way to
think about the formation of society is to posit that it is human vulnerability that
brings individuals into families, families into communities, and communities
into societies, nation states, and international organizations.”).
Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, 53 Val. U. L. Rev.
341, 355–56 (2019) [hereinafter, Fineman, Social Justice].
See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 7, at 10–11.
See id. at 11–12.
See Fineman, Social Justice, supra note 12, at 355 n.79 (“I intentionally use
the male pronoun here because the political subject that governs our current
institutional imagination is based on a limited notion of the human experience,
one that reflects the understanding of the male, white, property-owning or taxpaying, certain age and/or religion, and free framer of the U.S. Constitution.”).
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and personal responsibility.16 In the legal realm, the liberal subject produces
a valorization of formal legal equality.17
This valorization manifests in the United States as an antidiscrimination legal
regime, enforced primarily by the courts through legal action by individuals.18
The main question in this antidiscrimination regime is what types of legal
distinctions the courts should look more skeptically upon, applying strict
scrutiny. These grounds have traditionally been understood as identity-based
categories, such as race or sex.19 While Fineman acknowledges that the
antidiscrimination regime has led to advances for individuals and groups
that were subordinated by laws creating distinctions on the basis of identity
characteristics, she also notes its several pernicious effects. First, it has left
intact and perhaps justified a host of other substantive inequalities in society
that are not addressed by the antidiscrimination norm.20 For example, while a
litigant might be able to attack legally a denial of housing or employment that is
based on certain identity characteristics, she will not find this antidiscrimination
regime helpful in addressing other social or material disadvantages that do
not derive proximately from identity-based bias. Thus, to the extent that
the antidiscrimination regime exhausts the legal remedies available, it can
serve to naturalize any remaining inequalities that cannot be addressed by
law. This leaves several of the individuals who are members of subordinated
identity groups in a relatively poor position. Second, it has led to a politics of
competition and backlash. Newly protected groups may threaten the status of
other protected groups, and both will generate resentment from groups that
are not protected at all.21

See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 7, at 10.
See id. at 2–4.
See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 6, at 1725–30.
See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (“[W]e can only
conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon
race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”).
20 See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 6, at 1752 (“If the primary objective
is the eradication of inequality and discrimination, any measures designed to
achieve this objective will be rendered less effective by the limited scope of our
nondiscrimination inquiry.”).
21 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State,
60 Emory L.J. 251, 253 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, The Responsive State].
This approach to inequality has set up a perverse dynamic that often results in
pitting one protected group against another, dividing those who may otherwise
be allies in a struggle for a more just society, as well as generating a politics of
16
17
18
19
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In the place of the liberal subject, Fineman offers the vulnerable subject
as an alternative basis for social and political organization. This subject is
characterized by her experience of chronic and episodic dependency across
the lifecourse as well as her connectedness to others.22 Once one accepts
the universal nature of vulnerability, one must also recognize the need for
a “responsive state.”23 By responsive state, Fineman means a state that is
“grounded in vulnerability, addresses the range of dependencies inherent
over the life course, and is attentive to all stages of development and forms
of need.”24 This “attentiveness” seems to imply an activist state that pursues
more universalistic social policies to address universal vulnerabilities. Thus,
while her theory starts with the vulnerable subject as a descriptive matter, its
normative focus is on the political, economic, and social ordering of society.
This is a noted difference from starting conceptually with the individual, or
even with populations within society, which are considered as secondary to
establishing whether the social order as a whole is just.25
The primary focus of this responsive state is not to eliminate vulnerability,
as that is not possible. Instead, it is to promote resilience. Fineman links
this goal to substantive equality, which she frames as ensuring equality of
opportunity and access to various types of resources.26 While the nature of
substantive equality is not defined with specificity, this framing suggests that
Fineman has in mind distributive equality, or the embrace of distributive
justice principles that “claim that individuals should have equal quantities of
well-being or morally relevant factors that affect their life.”27
Fineman’s more recent work has called into question whether substantive
equality is indeed the end goal of vulnerability theory. Instead, she substitutes

22
23
24
25

26
27

resentment and backlash on the part of those who perceive they are not within
groups favored by this approach to equal protection.
See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 7, at 11.
See id. at 19–22.
See Fineman, Social Justice, supra note 12, at 369.
See id. at 360 (“We cannot adequately assess what is just on an individual or
group basis without considering the justice of the fundamental social order.
The societal problems of general organization and order must define state
responsibility in the first instance.”). This of course raises the question of how
one might evaluate the justness of the fundamental social order without reference
to how it affects individuals or groups within society.
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 7, at 13-14.
See Iwao Hirose, Egalitarianism 1 (2015). See also Alexander A. Boni-Saenz,
Distributive Justice and Donative Intent, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 324, 351–53 (2018)
(describing the various types of equality).
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the concept of “equity.”28 The traditional meaning of this term connotes a
distribution according to merit or need,29 or a series of courts dedicated to
implementing fairness in the law.30 While equity as understood by vulnerability
theory will presumably be developed in further work, it is not entirely clear
at the moment how the concept differs from substantive equality.31 Thus, this
Article uses the two terms interchangeably.
B. Age
Vulnerability theory must contend with age, for a variety of reasons. First, the
theory has explicitly adopted a lifecourse perspective as a way of demonstrating
the universality of vulnerability.32 It is present not just in traditionally identified
“vulnerable populations” such as children and the elderly, but it exists across
the lifespan. Second, as a practical matter, the inevitable dependency that we
all experience at various points in our lives can be a result of the aging process
and may at times be strongly correlated with age.33 These understandings are
reflected in the law’s extensive use of age, which is due to age’s administrative
28 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality, 4 Oslo
L. Rev. 133, 143 (2017) (“In this regard, one advantage of vulnerability theory
is that it can be applied in situations of inevitable or unresolvable inequality: it
does not seek equality, but equity.”).
29 See, e.g., Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics 76–78 (David Ross trans., J.L.
Ackrill & J.O. Urmson eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1568) (discussing
proportional equality in distributive justice).
30 See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Relations Between Equity and Law, 11
Mich. L. Rev. 537, 549–50 (describing the various functions and maxims of
equity).
31 While Fineman does not put it in terms of equity, one possibility is that her
primary concern is with avoiding societal injury, with injury conceptualized as
the state neglecting the situation of the vulnerable subject. See Martha Albertson
Fineman, Injury in the Unresponsive State: Writing the Vulnerable Subject into
Neo-Liberal Legal Culture, in Injury and Injustice: The Cultural Politics of
Harm and Redress (Anne Bloom et al. eds., 2018). It remains to be seen whether
this understanding of injury is meant as a version of resilience promotion, as the
goal of equity itself, or as a third complementary aim of vulnerability theory.
32 See Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality and Difference — The Restrained
State, 66 Ala. L. Rev. 609, 617–18 (2015) [hereinafter Fineman, Equality and
Difference] (“Fundamental to this reconstruction of the political subject are both
the incorporation of a life-course perspective and engagement with the institutions
and relationships in which social identities are formed and enforced.”).
33 See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject, supra note 7, at 8 (“Children and the
elderly are prototypical examples of more sympathetic vulnerable populations.”).
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simplicity and the fact that it can serve as a reasonably reliable proxy for a
variety of target variables or social concerns.34
Vulnerability is a key target variable. The law heavily marks the transition
from a vulnerable childhood to a more resilient adulthood through a variety
of bright-line “age of” rules, where the age selected is being used as a proxy
for the maturation of certain physical or mental capacities.35 While maturity
represents the presumed acquisition of the capacities to be a full citizen and
private actor, age is also often used as a proxy for vulnerability due to the
presumed loss of said capacities at an older age. Age is certainly correlated
with declines in certain types of physical and mental functioning, but the
picture is more complex than popular opinion might suggest, as aging is a
highly individualized process.36 That being said, the proxy becomes stronger
when examining the population of the old-old, or those over the age of 85,
who more generally experience the types of functional declines that are
stereotypically associated with age.37
The law in the United States recognizes age as a proxy for vulnerability
that derives not only from internal capacities but also from external forces.
For example, the labor market is a common site for age-based rules to address
perceived vulnerability to market forces or demands. Child labor laws are

34 See Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the
Forgotten, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 315, 318 (1998) (“[P]roxy discrimination is merely
a tool used to identify a class of persons or things with a different identifying
trait, the ‘target’”).
35 See Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 Tul. L. Rev. 55,
62 (2016) (“Childhood and adulthood are also socially and legally constructed
statuses whose meanings have varied dramatically over time and across cultures.”).
36 See Linda S. Whitton, Ageism: Paternalism and Prejudice, 46 DePaul L. Rev.
453, 468 (1997) (noting that “most current literature rejects the decline and failure
paradigm of normal aging, concluding that both cognitive and physiological
changes occur in varying degrees and at individuated rates”).
37 See Nina A. Kohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Age Discrimination: A
Challenge to a Decades-Old Consensus, 44 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 213, 277 (2010)
(“Chronological age, for example, is a more accurate predictor of physical
and cognitive disabilities for the oldest of the old than it is for the young-old
or old.”). See also Carol D. Austin & Marin B. Loeb, Why Age Is Relevant, in
Age or Need 263, 267 (Bernice Neugarten ed., 1982) (dividing the old into
multiple categories as opposed to a homogenous group); See Judith G. Gonyea,
The Oldest Old and a Long-Lived Society: Challenges for Public Policy, in The
New Politics of Old Age Policy 183, 193–94 (Robert B. Hudson ed., 2d ed.
2010) (discussing the oldest old).
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meant to prevent the exploitation of children in the workplace.38 Employment
discrimination laws based on age protect those over 40 from adverse employment
decisions, preventing firms from discarding older employees who are seen
as too expensive.39 The fact that the job market is not hospitable to older
workers is often the justification for the use of age in the award of alimony
upon divorce.40 Further, Social Security Disability regulations employ age
through various legal guidelines for administrative adjudicators (often called
“the Grids”), which make it easier to qualify for benefits the older you are,
even with the same level of impairment.41 This represents the understanding
that older workers fare worse in obtaining new employment as they age, and
thus that functional impairments will be more of a hindrance to this population
when other sources of disadvantage are taken into account.42
38 See Marie A. Failinger, “Too Cheap Work for Anybody But Us”: Toward a
Theory and Practice of Good Child Labor, 35 Rutgers L.J. 1035, 1067–68
(2004) (contrasting individual and structural reasons for child labor).
39 See Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1813, 1815 (1996) (“The hands-tying perspective on the
ADEA is grounded in a striking empirical regularity in the ADEA cases: older
workers are often terminated or otherwise disfavored because they command
higher wages than younger workers capable of performing the same job.”).
Highly-paid older workers may not strike some as particularly sympathetic,
but the termination from employment can have serious consequences. These
individuals may be too old to find new employment due to discrimination and
too young to qualify for age-based public assistance programs, not to mention
the loss in social meaning and social networks they can experience due to the
deprivation of employment.
40 See Bailey v. Bailey, 617 So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
In my own mind, the factor of age weighs more heavily in favor of permanent
alimony when the spouse requesting permanent alimony is approaching fifty.
We cannot ignore the present economic reality that, as they become older,
people have a more difficult time reentering the job market or improving
their economic station within the job market.
See also Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical
Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 401, 486 (1996)
(noting that “only three variables — the wife’s age, her health, and marital
duration — were significantly correlated with the decision to award alimony
for an unlimited time period”).
41 See 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 (the medical-vocational guidelines,
which explicitly incorporate age in evaluating eligibility for benefits).
42 Robert E. Grey, The Use of Medical Impairment, Functional Loss, and Vocational
Factors to Determine Loss of Wage Earning Capacity Under the 2012 Guidelines
for Permanent Impairment, 63 Syracuse L. Rev. 353, 373 (2013) (“It is generally
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The multilayered relationship between age, vulnerability, and the law is
likely what led Fineman to apply her theory to older adults early on. In The
“Elderly” As Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature of Individual and Societal
Responsibility,43 Fineman critiques the focus on age as an identity category,
noting that it serves to single out the elderly as a vulnerable population rather
than to recognize that vulnerability is a universal phenomenon.44 Examining
the Law Commission of Ontario’s report on older adults, she points out how a
concern with pursuing an “anti-ageist” methodology and a failure to recognize
universal vulnerability prevent the Commission from realistically engaging
with the lived experiences of vulnerable older adults.45 She then turns to the
responsive state to design institutions and policies that may address certain
universal vulnerabilities — such as vulnerability to financial exploitation
— that might also affect older adults, even if these institutions and policies
might be seen as paternalistic.46 For example, she suggests empowering the
state to render transactions in which there is “overreaching or exploitation”
null and void, imposing fines on those who take advantage of people who
are vulnerable to financial exploitation, or creating new torts and criminal
penalties for financial fraud.47
Others have already critiqued Fineman’s application of vulnerability theory
to older adults, claiming that it lacks prescriptive value and has the potential for
undue paternalism.48 That is not the focus of this Article. Instead, I would like

43

44
45
46
47
48

accepted that age has an impact on wage earning capacity and that older workers
have fewer employment opportunities than younger workers. Thus, the same
injury has a greater impact on wage earning capacity for an older worker than
it does for a younger worker.”) (footnote omitted).
See Martha Albertson Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable: Rethinking the Nature
of Individual and Societal Responsibility, 20 Elder L.J. 71 (2012) [hereinafter
Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable]. She also later followed up with an article
about LGBT youth, though that piece focused less on the role of age and more
on the vulnerabilities of sexual minorities. See Martha Albertson Fineman,
Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, 23 Temp. Pol. & C.R. L. Rev. 307
(2014).
See Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable, supra note 43, at 79–83.
See id. at 89–91.
See id. at 94–95.
See id.
See Nina A. Kohn, Vulnerability Theory and the Role of Government, 26 Yale
J.L. & Feminism 1, 21 (2014) (“Vulnerability theory as currently articulated
would focus attention on maximizing safety and security without adequately
considering the impact of potential laws and policies on individual autonomy,
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to use age as an entry point to explore some unresolved theoretical issues in
vulnerability theory itself, particularly the theory’s relationship with equality.

II. Problems with Equality
This Part examines two interrelated problems that vulnerability theory has in
its relationship with the concept of substantive equality or equity. First, the
lifecourse perspective that vulnerability theory embraces creates some troubling
implications for understanding equality in the context of age-group justice.
Second, the comparative nature of the equality inquiry creates problems for
the purported goal of vulnerability theory — substantive equality or equity
— just as it does for formal legal equality.
A. Equality, Time, and Age
In discussions of philosophy and law, equality has been a flashpoint and a central
ideal.49 It figures as an important contender for the best rule for distributive
justice, or the distribution of benefits and burdens over the population.50 It
also structures the debate over what the proper “currency” of distributive
justice is, or what it is that we are seeking to distribute: resources, utility,
capabilities, etc. This is also known as the “equality of what?” debate.51 Legal
scholars have recognized and embraced equality as a legal norm as well, and
much of their debate focuses on the tension between formal legal equality and
substantive equality, particularly with respect to salient categories of identity
such as race or sex that feature prominently in Equal Protection jurisprudence.52

49
50
51
52

or how a sense of autonomy may actually contribute to an individual’s safety
and security.”).
See Stuart White, Equality 1 (2007) (“The demand for equality is central to
modern politics. It has inspired many of the major political struggles of the past
two centuries . . . .”).
See Robert Hockett, Putting Distribution First, 18 Theoretical Inquiries L.
157, 165 (2017).
See Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in The Philosophy of Economics:
An Anthology 270, 283 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 3d ed. 2008) (discussing the
different currencies of well-being).
See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law,
100 Yale L.J. 1281, 1287 (1991) (“Inequality is treating someone differently
if one is the same, the same if one is different. Unquestioned is how difference
is socially created or defined, who sets the point of reference for sameness, or
the comparative empirical approach itself.”).
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These debates have been productive and interesting, but relatively less
attention has been paid to a central egalitarian concern (time) and corresponding
socio-legal category (age). The first generation of political philosophers
exclusively concerned with distributive justice operated using “grossly
simplifying assumptions of a largely timeless world.”53 What was missing
was an analysis of equality and time, with the central question being the
following: What should be the temporal unit of analysis for equality?54 In
other words, in judging whether a particular situation is just, do we assess
whether that situation comports with equality based on a moment in time or
over a longer time period?
Larry Temkin summarizes the three primary views in this debate: complete
lives egalitarianism (where the complete life is the moral unit of concern),
simultaneous segments egalitarianism (where simultaneous time-slice segments
are the moral unit of concern), and corresponding segments egalitarianism
(where corresponding time-slice segments — youth, middle age, old age, for
example — of an individual’s life are the moral unit of concern, regardless
of whether they are simultaneous with other individuals’ own time-slice
segments).55 The major philosophers who have considered the issue have
accepted or assumed that the complete life of an individual is the morally
relevant temporal unit.56 This is the lifetime egalitarianism or complete lives
approach. According to this view, there must be equality over the complete
lifetimes of separate individuals.57 At any given moment in time, there might

53 Peter Laslett & James Fishkin, Justice Between Age Groups and Generations
1 (1992).
54 Some philosophers have since taken up this question. See, e.g., Juliana Bidadanure,
Justice Across Ages: Treating Young and Old as Equals (forthcoming 2019);
Larry Temkin, Inequality 232–44 (1989) (discussing temporal issues in equality
theory); Dennis McKerlie, Equality and Time, 99 Ethics 475, 491 (1989)
(advocating for a time-slice view of egalitarianism).
55 See Temkin, supra note 54, at 233–35.
56 See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality 69 (1991) (“Remember that
the subject of an egalitarian principle is not the distribution of particular rewards
to individuals at some time, but the prospective quality of their lives as a whole,
from birth to death.”); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of
Resources, 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 283, 304–05 (1981) (describing the goal as
equality of resources across the lives of each person); John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice 78 (1971) (claiming that individuals behind the veil of ignorance would
make decisions based on the long-term life prospects that they might face).
57 See John Broome, Weighing Lives 117–39 (2004) (arguing for the separability
of lives).
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be inequalities between individuals, but these may be allowed, justified, or
perhaps even required to ensure equality over lifetimes.58
This lifetime view has a certain intuitive appeal, as we often consider our
lives as having a “narrative unity,” with meaningful relationships between
different temporal segments that make up our story.59 Further, it embodies
a compensation principle, or the notion that inequalities in one segment of
a person’s life can be compensated for in another part of that person’s life.60
For example, putting in hard work at law school could be worthwhile if it
enhances one’s employment and earning prospects for the rest of one’s life.61
This highlights the lifetime view’s recognition of the importance of history,
which enables some consideration of personal responsibility and choice as
well.62 Many versions of egalitarianism prefer distributive equality between
people except when inequalities are due to voluntary choices made by those
people.63 In other words, we might see as morally different the situations of
58 See Norman Daniels, Am I My Parents’ Keeper?: An Essay on Justice Between
the Young and Old 83–95 (1988) (defending age rationing in healthcare and
employment in situations of scarcity based on his Prudential Lifespan Account,
a Rawlsian interpretation of the lifetime view). See also Matthew D. Adler,
Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis 430–42
(2011) (arguing for lifetime prioritarianism).
59 See Helen Small, The Long Life 95 (2007) (“‘[N]arrative unity’ tends to be
understood non-literally, and simplifyingly, as a matter of there being significant
connections between the different temporal parts or stages of a story and by
analogy a life.”).
60 See Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Luck Egalitarianism 154 (2016) (arguing
that the possibility of compensation is a benefit to the lifetime view); Dennis
McKerlie, Justice Between the Young and Old, 30 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 152, 154
(2002) (discussing the compensation principle).
61 See Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree,
43 J. Legal Stud. 249, 284 (2014) (finding that “a law degree is associated with
an increase of approximately 84 percent in expected mean monthly earnings
. . . , a 65 percent increase in mean hourly wages . . . , and reduced risk of
unemployment or underemployment”).
62 See Paul Bou-Habib, Distributive Justice, Dignity, and the Lifetime View, 37
Soc. Theory & Prac. 285 (2011) (“It is widely accepted among theorists of
justice that a person’s claims of distributive justice at a given moment in time
should sometimes reflect her earlier exercises of responsibility.”).
63 See Shlomi Segall, Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, Its Meaning
and Value 23–24 (2016) (defending equality as intrinsically valuable so long
as inequalities derive only from the fault of one’s own actions); Larry Temkin,
Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection, in The Ideal of Equality
126, 129 (Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2000) (“[Egalitarians]
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two individuals who are equally destitute but who arrived at that condition
through different means. One might be destitute through no fault of her
own while another might have acted foolishly by profligately spending her
considerable wealth. If we assess these two individuals solely at this point
in time without reference to historical context, we might miss a relevant fact
about their situations. For those who care about incorporating some notion
of desert or responsibility into distributions (and not all egalitarians do),64
lifetime egalitarianism allows a consideration of these relevant historical facts.65
The U.S. Supreme Court seemed to accept, at least implicitly, the lifetime
egalitarian view in its seminal case Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia, where it addressed the constitutional acceptability of age-based legal
distinctions.66 This case involved a Massachusetts state law that required
mandatory retirement of police officers at age fifty.67 Robert Murgia challenged
the law, and there was no dispute that his “excellent physical and mental
health still rendered him capable of performing the duties of a uniformed
officer.”68 While noting that the aged face discrimination, the Court declined
to apply strict scrutiny to the class of police officers over fifty, saying that
“even old age does not define a ‘discrete and insular’ group [citing United
States v. Carolene Products Co.], in need of ‘extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process.’ Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will
reach if we live out our normal span.”69 If we each experience employment
opportunities before a mandatory retirement age and then each experience

64

65

66
67
68
69

care about undeserved, nonvoluntary, inequalities, which they regard as bad, or
objectionable, because unfair.”).
See, e.g., Samuel Scheffler, What is Egalitarianism?, 31 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 5, 17
(2003) (“[T]he luck-egalitarian position is open to doubt on a number of grounds.
Perhaps the most obvious difficulty is that the degree of weight that the luck
egalitarian places on the distinction between choices and circumstances seems,
on its face, to be both philosophically dubious and morally implausible.”).
See Dennis McKerlie, Justice Between the Young and the Old 31 (2013) (“So
it seems that, to give proper weight to facts about choice and responsibility, we
must be prepared in principle to consider the past and the future when assessing
a present inequality.”).
Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
See id. at 308.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 313–14 (italics added). This holding was later reconfirmed in Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) (mandatory retirement for foreign service officers
at age 60 permissible under the Equal Protection Clause).
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that mandatory retirement, the argument goes, it does not offend equality.70
Over a complete life, police officers, in Massachusetts at least, will each have
an equal level of employment opportunity.71
Vulnerability theory would likely view the entire exercise of determining
whether age should be subject to rational basis review or strict scrutiny as
a distraction from the promotion of social policies that promote resilience
across the lifespan. But the Murgia case underscores the positive relationship
between lifetime egalitarianism and vulnerability theory. They both share
an emphasis on a lifecourse perspective. The former embraces an holistic
analysis of the lifecourse as a way to ensure that there is substantive equality
across the morally relevant temporal unit: lifetimes. The latter embraces the
lifecourse perspective as it reveals that vulnerability is universal and not
limited to certain populations or temporal segments of life. This insight, in
turn, allows a pursuit of substantive equality or equity rather than a focus on
identity categories and antidiscrimination law.
But does lifetime egalitarianism capture all of our intuitions with respect
to age and time? The philosopher Dennis McKerlie has criticized an exclusive
focus on lifetimes and has instead made the lonely case for the time-slice
egalitarian view.72 This view holds that the relevant temporal unit of analysis is
something shorter than entire lifetimes. Thus, egalitarians should be concerned
about substantive inequalities that manifest in simultaneous slices of time. The
time-slice approach to egalitarianism has failed to gather many adherents, as
it not only lacks the benefits of the lifetime egalitarian approach but also has
the problem that it is difficult to specify the size of the slice of time that might
70 In other work, I have explained why lifetime egalitarianism fails to serve as an
adequate basis for statutory age-based antidiscrimination law, pointing to the
need for an alternative or complementary non-comparative value foundation
for that area of law. See generally Boni-Saenz, supra note 1.
71 While police officers are treated equally over their lifetimes under this scheme,
one might object that police officers are treated unequally by this age-based
rule when one compares them to members of other professional groups. This
objection invokes lifetime egalitarianism, but the discrimination involved is
based on profession rather than age. There may be justifiable reasons for treating
police officers differently than other groups with respect to retirement, once one
accepts the possibility of mandatory retirement.
72 See McKerlie, supra note 54, at 491:
I have argued that the most plausible time-relative view about equality
will require equality in the simultaneous segments of different lives. Our
lives are lived serially through time, and the simultaneous segments view
responds to this fact by valuing equality in the simultaneous parts of lives
rather than by merely requiring that lives should be equal when viewed
timelessly as completed wholes.
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be appropriate for egalitarian analysis. There does not appear to be a natural
candidate for a span of time smaller than a lifetime that might be morally
relevant — 1 hour, 1 month, 1 year, 1 decade?73 As a practical matter, if we
go too small, we ignore many of the contextual facts that might be relevant
to assessing substantive equality. For example, if the relevant time slice
were one hour, and it happens that one individual had to have a root canal
treatment at that hour, we might be required to compensate her for the pain
and cost of that procedure and ignore that others might go through the same
experience the next hour.74 If we go too large, we might lose the benefits of
using a sub-lifetime measure, which is to capture inequalities at moments in
time that might present themselves within a lifetime.75
However, McKerlie has illuminated his view through powerful examples
that demonstrate the undesirable consequences of the lifetime egalitarian view.
Imagine a feudal society that contains two classes of individuals: aristocratic
nobles and exploited serfs. Now say that everyone in one class changes places
with everyone in the other class every ten years, providing for lifetime equality
as between the groups.76 Thus, for alternating decades, individuals would be
denied the resources needed for resilience. Is this substantive equality or equity?
The simple version of lifetime egalitarianism has the potential to justify vast
sub-lifetime inequalities that actualize the harms of universal vulnerability.
Can it really be the case that we can deny various social and legal entitlements
to individuals so long as we deny them to all at the appropriate time? The
idea that two injustices create justice seems odd at best.
An example that is both more realistic and more on point for the discussion
of age comes from McKerlie’s most recent work:
[I]magine that the same city block contains a condominium complex
and a retirement home. The residents of the complex are middle
aged, middle class, affluent, and happy. The retirement home is old,
73 See Juliana Bidadanure, On Dennis McKerlie’s Equality and Time, 125 Ethics
1174, 1177 (2015):
One problem is that [simultaneous segments egalitarianism] may seem to
define the segments that matter (T1, T2, and T3) arbitrarily. In theory, we
may always select smaller segments in which case defining the worse-off
would become arbitrary. By contrast, complete lives egalitarians seem to
have identified the least arbitrary segment to apply the value of equality
to: the segment of a life. Complete lives may thus be thought as the par
excellence time unit of distributive equality.
74 See McKerlie, supra note 54, at 483 (using the dentist example but not finding
it damning).
75 See id.
76 See id. at 479.
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overcrowded, and badly managed. Its residents receive medical care,
but their situation offers them little dignity and little opportunity for
anything approaching happiness.77
This in fact may accurately portray the existence of many older individuals in
the United States. Is this inequality not objectionable because we all know that
those middle-aged, middle-class residents will experience misery themselves
in the retirement home someday? Lifetime egalitarianism appears to permit
these substantive inequalities or inequities, provided that their existence is
stable through the lifetimes of different individuals in society. Through its
implicit association with this view, so does vulnerability theory.
One potential way out of this dilemma is to shift our concern with equality
toward social or relational equality, as opposed to distributive equality.78
This incarnation of the equality norm maintains that equality is achieved in
society when it lacks hierarchical relationships or power structures.79 Thus,
McKerlie’s examples are morally concerning not for distributive reasons,
but instead because they reflect morally undesirable hierarchy or power
relationships. This sidesteps the temporal question presented by distributive
equality because the analytical lens has been widened to groups or society
as a whole, neither of which have lifetimes. This version of equality would
likely be harmonious with vulnerability theory. However, because Fineman
wishes to deal at least in part with issues of distribution in society, such a
shift will not completely eliminate the temporal issues raised by equality for
vulnerability theory.
B. Comparative Method
The age/time problem in equality theory is not the only challenge that
vulnerability theory must contend with, even if it adopts a substantive
version of the equality norm in the form of equity. Equality is a comparative
concept, and thus it requires a comparison between individuals or groups.80
77 McKerlie, supra note 65, at 6–7.
78 See Juliana Bidadanure, Making Sense of Age Group Justice: A Time for Relational
Equality?, 15 Pol. Phil. & Econ. 234 (2016) (suggesting that relational equality
is what gives McKerlie’s examples normative force).
79 See Samuel Scheffler, The Practice of Equality, in Social Equality: On What It
Means to Be Equals 21, 21–22 (Carina Fourie et al. eds., 2015) (distinguishing
between distributive equality and a relational or social view of equality).
80 See Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 Va. L. Rev. 895,
900 (2016) (“According to the comparative conception of discrimination, we
determine whether X has suffered wrongful discrimination by looking at the
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Courts have focused on the “Who?” element of the comparison. In deciding
antidiscrimination cases, many courts and legal commentators have tried to
determine whether a comparator is required for a successful antidiscrimination
claim and who the appropriate comparator might be.81 The problems with
such an approach for formal legal equality are well-known, but as Fineman
points out, the problems persist even for a substantive measure of equality:
In a system with a more substantive equality doctrine in place, a more
inclusive process might involve the development of an ideal baseline
or general right standard against which to measure the situation of a
specific individual or group. But it may be as likely that the autonomous
liberal subject will emerge here as the measure, as he or she has in so
many other contexts. The fact that one pole for comparison is developed
in the abstract does not lessen either the comparative nature of the
process or the problems with comparisons.82
While Fineman focuses on how the comparative method may allow the liberal
autonomous subject to rear its ugly head, there are additional problems with
it, at least with respect to the aims of vulnerability theory. Harry Frankfurt, a
leading critic of equality, saw the principle as both distracting and alienating.
Writing in the context of economic equality, he saw it as having these qualities
because it focuses individuals on what others have or need, rather than on what
is important in life more generally or on what our own interests or needs might
be.83 This critique sounds in the same register as vulnerability theory, which
treatment X has received . . . and comparing it to the treatment accorded to at
least one other individual.”).
81 See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005) (noting that “side-by-side
comparisons” of black and white jurors would be relevant to ascertaining race
discrimination in jury selection pursuant to a Batson challenge); McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (noting that employee
comparators would be helpful in establishing employer motive); Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 Yale L.J. 728, 748 (2011)
(“Comparators become relevant to the analysis, then, because they help expose
— whether in the single- or mixed-motive analysis — that “likes” have been
treated in an “unlike” fashion and give rise to the inference that discrimination
is the reason for that differentiation.”).
82 See Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable, supra note 43, at 103–04.
83 Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About 136 (1988):
A concern for economic equality, construed as desirable in itself, tends to
divert a person’s attention away from endeavoring to discover — within
his experience of himself and his life — what he himself really cares about
and what will actually satisfy him, although this is the most basic and the
most decisive task upon which an intelligent selection of economic goals
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seeks to refocus discourse on what our shared human condition might be —
our vulnerability — rather than on how we measure up to other categories of
individuals, defined in some way by legal rules and identity characteristics.
Vulnerability theory’s adherence to substantive equality or equity also
highlights underdeveloped aspects of the theory captured by the following
two questions: “What is substantive equality?” and “Equality of what?” In
other words, what does substantive equality or equity mean, and what is it
that we are trying to equalize or make equitable? These are crucial questions
to answer, as they inform how we might design the institutions that would
bring about the stated goal. At times, the ambitions of vulnerability theory
seem to be quite broad. The end goal is substantive equality, as opposed to
formal legal equality, and that is defined in terms of equality of opportunity
or access, though not equality of outcome.84 At other times, the goals of
vulnerability theory seem more modest and focused on a different currency
of justice. The main concern seems to be promotion of resilience in order to
address the negative aspects of vulnerability. However, it is not clear whether
it is resilience that must be equalized — whatever that might entail — or rather
the list of assets or resources that one might need to be resilient: physical,
human, social, ecological/environmental, and existential.85 The answer to this
breadth question will also answer the question whether vulnerability theory
is intended as a partial or complete theory of justice.
Thus, vulnerability theory is left with an equality problem, composed of two
parts. First, a lifetime egalitarian perspective focused on substantive equality is
attractive for a variety of reasons, in that it transcends the limitations of formal
legal equality, recognizes the importance of the lifecourse perspective, and
meshes well with the rhetoric of vulnerability theory. However, it seemingly
permits sub-lifetime inequalities that would not achieve the fundamental
goal of vulnerability theory in promoting resilience across the lifecourse.
Meanwhile, the main time-slice egalitarian alternative within the “equality
and time” philosophical debate suffers from its own flaws.
The second problem is more fundamental. The comparative nature of equality
discourse requires the selection of comparators in order to assess whether an
outcome is just. This has the effect of creating the divisions and backlash seen
in the context of formal legal equality. However, in the absence of a suitable
real-life comparator, it also risks that an abstract liberal autonomous self
depends. Exaggerating the moral importance of economic equality is
harmful, in other words, because it is alienating.
84 See Fineman, The Responsive State, supra note 21, at 256–57 (arguing that
vulnerability helps to analyze how to achieve “the often-glorified American
commitment to equality of opportunity and access”).
85 See id. at 270–72 (describing the five types of resources).
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will be the comparison point, even in the discourse of substantive equality.
Further, if the theory were to continue to endorse substantive equality or equity,
then there are several theoretical issues that must be clarified, including the
currency of justice with which vulnerability theory is concerned as well as
the precise contours of substantive equality or equity.
The next Part offers some thoughts on a way forward by sketching out a
general outline of a different distributive justice approach for vulnerability
theory that is likely a better fit.

III. Sufficiency
If vulnerability theory should abandon substantive equality, what should
replace this concept at the center of the theory? This Article offers the following
possibility: sufficiency.86 Stated simply, the doctrine of sufficiency posits that
“what is important from the point of view of morality is not that everyone have
the same but that each should have enough.”87 This doctrine better answers
the temporal questions raised by equality in the context of distributive justice
and also meshes better with the underlying aims and rhetoric of vulnerability
theory. However, it raises additional questions that vulnerability theory will
have to answer, but they may be less intractable than those presented for the
theory by equality.
A. Sufficiency, Time, and Age
Like equality, sufficiency can come in a couple of different temporal forms.88
Complete lives sufficiency would evaluate whether an individual has had
86 At points, Fineman has seemed to contemplate the possibility of a sufficiency
standard. See Fineman, “Elderly” as Vulnerable, supra note 43, at 104 (considering
a more “basic” form of equality that provides the elderly with a floor of resources
below which they should not fall).
87 Frankfurt, supra note 83, at 134 (first italics omitted). In terms of distributive
principles, sufficiency is often seen as being composed of two theses: “Positive
thesis: priority is given to benefits to those below the sufficiency level over those
above the sufficiency level. . . . Negative thesis: No priority is given to benefits
to those above the sufficiency level.” See Paula Casal, Why Sufficiency is Not
Enough, 117 Ethics 296, 297–98 (2007). Similarly, Vulnerability Theory would
likely remain agnostic as regards those who have “enough,” which I suggest
should be defined as the capability to be resilient.
88 See McKerlie, supra note 65, at 55 n.2 (describing the different temporal forms
of sufficientarianism).
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enough in her entire life. This version of sufficiency has similar pernicious
side effects to lifetime egalitarianism. Specifically, it would seemingly permit
one to experience the negative aspects of vulnerability at a later age in life
because one had already met the sufficiency threshold for one’s life before
that point. One way in which this argument has been advanced is to justify
rationing of healthcare resources by age because those who are of a certain
age have already had their “fair innings.”89 This version of sufficiency is a
poor fit with vulnerability theory. First, it directly contradicts vulnerability
theory’s emphasis on universal vulnerability. There is little point to highlighting
that vulnerability exists across the lifecourse if the state has no responsibility
to assist those at the older end of it. Second, it only serves to exacerbate
intergenerational conflicts, with different age groups fighting over societal
resources. It is vulnerability theory’s explicit objective to move beyond these
types of identity-based battles.
Fortunately, there is a promising alternative in continuous sufficiency.90
This version of sufficiency would require that each individual in society be
accorded “enough” at all points in time, regardless of age. This comports with
vulnerability theory’s focus on universalism and a lifecourse perspective.
Because the focus is on maintaining a floor of legal and social entitlements
rather than a comparison of those entitlements with others in society, it
avoids some of the problems of time-slice egalitarianism, which depends
on temporally-constrained comparative evaluations that have the potential
to ignore important context of the past or future. Thus, determining what
is enough is not a comparative exercise, but it is a contextual one. What is
enough will certainly be at least in part socially, culturally, and historically
contingent, but it does not inherently require comparison to other individuals.91

89 See Alan Williams, Intergenerational Equity: An Exploration of the ‘Fair
Innings’ Argument, 6 Health Econ. 117, 129 (1997) (making this argument in
the allocation of healthcare).
90 See Richard Wagland, A Fair Innings or Complete Life: Another Attempt at an
Egalitarian Justification of Ageism, in Justice for Older People 161, 170 (Harry
Lesser ed., 2012) (concluding that “an effective anti-ageist argument should
appeal to the idea that there are certain synchronic interests that have equal
moral value irrespective of the chronological age of the individual who holds
them.”); Axel Gosseries, Qu’est-ce que le suffisantisme?, 38 Philosophiques
465 (2011).
91 For example, we might endorse a list of universal and fundamental entitlements
for everyone, but leave their specification and implementation to individual
societies. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements:
Sen and Social Justice, 9 Feminist Econ. 33, 42 (2003):

182

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 21.1:161

Because sufficiency is a noncomparative principle, it avoids the reappearance
of the liberal subject through comparisons at all.92 This highlights the fact
that the vulnerability and sufficiency concepts have similar origin stories,
reacting as they did to versions of equality deemed unsatisfactory or pernicious
in some way. While vulnerability theory was formulated as a counterpoint
to formal legal equality, so too was sufficiency initially conceived of as
an alternative to equality as a moral ideal.93 Sufficiency’s noncomparative
character reveals a further advantage it has over equality. Instead of comparing
individuals or groups against each other, the ideal of sufficiency forces us to
examine the basic entitlements that the state should ensure for its citizens.
This complements vulnerability theory’s focus on the social arrangements
that are needed to address the situation of the vulnerable subject, rather than
on how individuals or groups fare.
B. The Sufficiency Threshold
While the doctrine of sufficiency has several advantages for vulnerability
theory, it also raises certain questions as well. A primary definitional question
is the following: how might we conceptualize the sufficiency threshold in
vulnerability theory?
Here is an initial answer: the sufficiency threshold has been met when the
social, political, and economic structure of society has facilitated sufficient
resilience for the vulnerable subject. There are three things to note about
this answer.
First, it focuses on the vulnerable subject but not on vulnerability per se.
It would not make sense to tie the sufficiency threshold to vulnerability, just
as it does not make sense to think of avoiding childhood or the aging process.
The vulnerability associated with these life stages or processes is an inevitable
aspect of our embodied existence. As such, one cannot lessen them, much less

[T]he items on the list ought to be specified in a somewhat abstract and general
way, precisely in order to leave room for the activities of specifying and
deliberating by citizens and their legislatures and courts that all democratic
nations contain. Within certain parameters it is perfectly appropriate that
different nations should do this somewhat differently, taking their histories
and special circumstances into account.
92 See Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 Phil. Rev. 297, 310–11 (1974)
(distinguishing between comparative and noncomparative theories of justice).
93 See Frankfurt, supra note 83, at 134 (“[Egalitarians] often urge that efforts to
approach the egalitarian ideal should be accorded . . . a significant priority. In
my opinion, this is a mistake.”).

2019]

Age, Equality, and Vulnerability

183

eradicate them completely. Instead, the sufficiency threshold must be tied to
resilience, a “critical but incomplete remedy for vulnerability.”94
Second, this definition highlights a further specification needed from
vulnerability theory. When the structures for the resilience of the vulnerable
subject are in place, these allow the vulnerable subject to bounce back from
a shock that she might have experienced. This, in turn, implies that there is
some baseline level of welfare that society must provide, i.e., the place to
which to bounce back. Vulnerability theory understandably focuses on the
resilience component of that baseline, but there are other aspects that should
be specified to be able to evaluate when society has provided the adequate
conditions for resilience.
Third, the sufficiency threshold is tied to an evaluation of the social
arrangements provided by the responsive state. This is the preferred discourse
in Fineman’s conception of vulnerability theory, with its focus on the structural
elements of society. These social arrangements, however, must eventually be
evaluated with respect to how they impact individuals in society and how well
they provide for the resilience to which those individuals must have access.
With this general definition of the sufficiency threshold in place, it is
worth exploring further what resilience means in vulnerability theory. This
foregrounds again the linked question of which currency of justice matters
for vulnerability theory, this time refracted through a sufficiency lens.
Resilience is best understood in the sufficiency context as a capability,
specifically the capability to be resilient.95 Capabilities are the ability to
achieve certain functionings, or the ability to do certain things or to achieve
certain states of being.96 They have significant advantages over other notable
measures of well-being, such as resources, as they take into account that
different individuals have different capacity to utilize resources and translate
them into desirable outcomes.97 For example, an older adult with disabilities
94 See Fineman, Equality and Difference, supra note 32, at 622 (“Resilience is the
critical but incomplete remedy for vulnerability. Although nothing can completely
mitigate vulnerability, resilience is what provides an individual with the means
and ability to recover from harm, setbacks, and the misfortunes that affect her
or his life.”).
95 See Catriona Mackenzie, The Importance of Relational Autonomy and Capabilities
for an Ethics of Vulnerability, in Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and
Feminist Philosophy 33, 48–55 (Catriona Mackenzie et al. eds., 2014) (also
suggesting that vulnerability theory explore the possibilities of sufficientarianism
and capabilities theory).
96 See Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 39–44 (1985).
97 See id. at 31–39. See also Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development:
The Capabilities Approach 111–61 (2000) (describing the problems with preference
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may require more resources than a young person without disabilities in order
to be able to manage an external shock, such as illness. Further, they do not
dictate outcomes, as what the individual does with her opportunities is up
to her.98 What is important is that the opportunity is available to achieve the
relevant functionings. Fineman has provided a list of assets or resources that
contribute to one having the capability of resilience, as noted above.99 This is
a useful start in determining what policies and laws the responsive state must
pursue to achieve a sufficient level of resilience for the vulnerable subject.
There is one large and final question: How do we know when a society has
achieved a structure that adequately provides the resources necessary for the
capability to be resilient? This question is beyond the scope of this Article,
but it is worth offering one possibility and noting its benefits and drawbacks.
One particular strain of sufficientarian thought may be attractive to and
compatible with vulnerability theory. Roger Crisp has suggested that we can
determine the sufficiency threshold by imagining when an impartial observer
would feel compassion for the situation of an individual.100 On the one hand,
this dovetails nicely with the positive aspect of vulnerability as something
that brings us together into relationships, communities, and societies. It is
likely that our affective bonds and the virtue of compassion trigger us to
feel for each other and to want to create communities of care to help address
the negative aspects of our vulnerability.101 In addition, because Fineman’s
conceptualization of vulnerability theory readily accepts universalism and the
abstraction of the vulnerable subject, it would not necessarily have problems
integrating the abstract compassionate observer.
satisfaction as a measure of well-being).
98 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species
Membership 171–73 (2006).
99 See supra text accompanying note 85.
100 See Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 Ethics 745, 758
(2003).
The Compassion Principle: absolute priority is to be given to benefits to
those below the threshold at which compassion enters. Below the threshold,
benefiting people matters more the worse off those people are, the more of
those people there are, and the greater the size of the benefit in question.
Above the threshold, or in cases concerning only trivial benefits below the
threshold, no priority is to be given.
101 See Lawrence Blum, Compassion, in Explaining Emotions 507, 509 (Amélie
Rorty ed., 1980) (“Compassion is not a simple feeling-state but a complex
emotional attitude toward another, characteristically involving imaginative
dwelling on the condition of the other person, an active regard for his good,
a view of him as a fellow human being, and emotional responses of a certain
degree of intensity.”).
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On the other hand, there are some drawbacks to this approach, both from
the perspective of vulnerability theory and from those who might critique
it. Crisp’s approach is centered on a hypothetical dyad, one who may or
may not have reached the sufficiency threshold and one who is observing
that individual and feeling or not feeling compassion for her situation. This
individual-level analysis strays from the society-level discourse that Fineman
envisions for vulnerability theory. However, this method of establishing the
sufficiency threshold may not be applicable on a society-wide level, as we
do not typically think of society as the object of compassion. At the very
least, this idea would have to be developed further by vulnerability theorists.
Even if it could be further developed, the impartial observer would certainly
be subject to many of the same criticisms that have been leveled at similar
conceptual constructs, such as Rawls’s original position and the veil of ignorance.
Specifically, such abstract subjects — liberal, vulnerable, or compassionate
— portray at best an incomplete vision of what it means to be a human agent,
most notably if we ignore the various categories of identity that inform our
conceptions of self, choices, and relationships to others.102 However tricky
these challenges might be, they are still likely to be less difficult than the
temporal and methodological issues posed by egalitarianism, which strike at
the core of vulnerability theory.

Conclusion
Martha Fineman has highlighted the importance of a particular aspect of the
human condition — vulnerability — and a corresponding need to promote the
capability for resilience. In addition, she has identified the various resources
that might contribute to resilience and thus has created a blueprint for the
design of the responsive state. This Article has suggested that she adopt a
sufficiency standard to help guide the vulnerability project, as a consideration
of age and age group justice shows that substantive equality poses a series
of serious dilemmas for vulnerability theory. Whichever path vulnerability
theory takes — toward equity or sufficiency — it will have to contend with
further philosophical questions. The hope is that this Article has clarified the
choices somewhat and opened up a potential new path.

102 See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,
12 Pol. Theory 81, 90–91 (1984) (critiquing the idea of a moral “unencumbered
self”).

